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Resisting Efforts to Provide Public Funding for Parochial
Education in the Wake of Zelman v. Simmons-Harris: A
Primer for North Carolina Advocates
Mary Elizabeth Hill Hanchey*
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,i the United States Supreme
Court upheld the Cleveland public school system's use of statefunded educational vouchers to pay for education at religious
schools.
In doing so, the Supreme Court ostensibly settled a
question that has epitomized the debate about the appropriate
intersection of church and government. 2 More importantly, the
Court set out a roadmap for states interested in addressing some of
the shortcomings of their public school systems by paying private
schools to educate their children. By conforming their voucher
programs to the criteria set out in Zelman, states can be sure, at
least for the time being, that these programs will not run afoul of
the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. 3 It remains to be
seen, however, to what extent the Zelman decision may shape state
educational policy at the ground level. Specifically, it is unclear
whether state constitutional provisions that prohibit what the
federal Constitution now allows will remain intact; 4 how, if at all,
the Zelman roadmap might apply to educational policy outside the
voucher context; and how, if at all, the Zelman roadmap might
inform opposition to the creation of voucher programs at the state
level.
This Note addresses these questions by examining
Zelman's relevance to the North Carolina Constitution and North
Carolina's educational policy. Part I discusses the Zelman decision
and the criteria that it sets forth. Part II offers a brief history of
* J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2003.
1. 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002).
2. See, e.g., Toby J. Heytens, Note, School Choice and State
Constitutions,86 VA. L. REv. 117, 121 (2000).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion ...... ).
4. See infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text (discussing the so-called
"Blaine Amendments"-state constitutional provisions that prohibit any state
funds from being disbursed to any religious institutions).
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North Carolina's struggles with educational reform, including the
creation of the charter schools program. Part III shows that a
voucher program such as Ohio's could be permissible under the
North Carolina Constitution. Part IV addresses the possibility that
charter programs might seek to use Zelman's structure to create
charters for religious schools, arguing that although such an
approach might be tailored to satisfy the Zelman criteria, the
essentially public nature of charter schools would nonetheless
create an insurmountable constitutional obstacle. Part V explores

strategies for policy makers and voucher opponents to resist, under
the Zelman framework, potential North Carolina educational
programs that would provide public funding to parochial schools.
Part VI offers a brief conclusion.
This Note is premised on the assumption that vouchers are
bad public policy and is designed in part to assist those in North
Carolina who would resist legislative efforts to channel public
funds to parochial schools in the wake of the Zelman decision.
Thus, rather than critiquing the Zelman decision itself, this Note
explores arguments against such efforts within the Zelman
framework. Of course, the assumption that vouchers are bad
public policy is a controversial one. 5 Because an in-depth analysis
5. Policy debates about vouchers gravitate toward two main focal points:
(1) debate about religious liberty and the separation of church and state, and (2)
debate about the educational benefit of vouchers. A survey of the relevant
literature reveals three primary policy arguments against vouchers. First,
voucher opponents argue that, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's five-four
decision in Zelman, the use of state funds to support religious education violates
the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. See Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 248586 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer)
(quoting the seemingly definitive pronouncement in Everson v. Bd. of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947), that "[n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied
to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or
whatever form they may adopt, to teach or practice religion"). Second, voucher
opponents argue that restrictions likely to follow state monies to religious
schools will either impermissibly infringe on religious liberty by diluting the
autonomy of religious leaders to decide how to staff and populate their schools
and what to teach about the supremacy of their religion, or constitute
unconstitutional preferentialism towards religion by allowing special
exemptions for religious institutions. See Pew Forum, infra note 8, at 9-10; cf
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 608 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting
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of the important policy issues underlying the school voucher
debate is beyond the scope of this paper, the author invites readers
to explore these issues on their own. For the purposes of this
paper, the author assumes that (1) the use of vouchers at religious
schools funds religious education,6 (2) attaching restrictions, such
that when the government funds religious institutions, even "the favored religion
may be compromised as political figures reshape the religion's beliefs for their
own purposes; it may be reformed as government largesse brings government
regulation"). Third, voucher opponents maintain that vouchers will negatively
impact the financial viability of already struggling public schools by siphoning
public money and resources toward private schools. See, e.g., BLOB and
Opposition Response, 4 EDUCATION REFORM NEWSWIRE No. 25 (Ctr. for Educ.
Reform, Washington D.C.), June 28, 2002 [hereinafter Ctr. for Educ. Reform]
(quoting Senator Edward Kennedy, National Education Association President
Bob Chase, and American Federation of Teachers President Sandra Feldman,
among others, in opposition to vouchers on these grounds), available at
http://www.edreform.com/update/2002/020628.html (on file with the First
Amendment Law Review). For an introduction to the literature in support of
vouchers, see Joseph L. Bast and David Harmer, The Libertarian Case for
Vouchers and Some Observations on the Anti-Voucher Separationists (Cato
Institute
Policy
Analysis
No.
269,
March
12,
1997),
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-269.html (on file with the First Amendment
Law Review); David Boaz and R. Morris Barrett, What Would a School Voucher
Buy? The Real Cost of Private Schools (Cato Institute Briefing Paper No. 25,
March 26, 1996), http://www.cato.org/pubs/briefs/bp-025.html (on file with the
First Amendment Law Review); Press Release, N.C. Educ. Alliance, Supreme
Court Takes Gigantic Step in Education Reform (Nov. 2002) (on file with the
First Amendment Law Review); Ctr. for Educ. Reform, The Truth About
Education Vouchers: New Information on School Choice (offering links to
several essays and empirical studies supporting school voucher programs), at
http://edreform.comlschoolchoice/truth.htm (last visited February 18, 2003)
(on file with the First Amendment Law Review).
6. In his Zelman dissent, Justice Souter discussed the problem as follows:
The money will thus pay for eligible students'
instruction not only in secular subjects but in religion
as well, in schools that can fairly be characterized as
founded to teach religious doctrine and to imbue
teaching in all subjects with a religious dimension.
Public tax money will pay at a systemic level for
teaching the covenant with Israel and Mosaic law in
Jewish schools, the primacy of the Apostle Peter and
the Papacy in Catholic schools, the truth of reformed
Christianity in Protestant schools, and the revelation to
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as federal law prohibiting discriminatory hiring, to the use of state
money at religious schools infringes on the religious liberty of the
participating schools or churches, 7 (3) failing to attach such

restrictions to the use of state money at religious school
unconstitutionally favors religion, 8 (4) the sustained financial
health of public schools is vital to provide a decent education to all
children, 9 and (5) money that funds
private school vouchers is
0
schools.'
public
to
denied
money

the Prophet in Muslim schools, to speak only of major
religious groupings in the Republic.
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2486 (2002)
(Souter, J., dissenting).
7. See, e.g., Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2499 (Souter, J. dissenting).
8. See, e.g., Thomas Berg et. al., Joint Statement by Church-StateScholars
on School Vouchers and the Constitution, in SCHOOL VOUCHERS: SETTLED
QUESTIONS, CONTINUING DISPUTES II (The Pew Forum on Religion and Pub.
Life, November 2002), http://pewforum.org/issues/filesNoucherPackage.pdf
(on file with the First Amendment Law Review) [hereinafter Pew Forum].
9. In Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Chief Justice Warren extolled the
importance of public education as follows:
Today, education is perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments. Compulsory
school attendance laws and the great expenditures for
education both demonstrate our recognition of the
importance of education to our democratic society. It is
required in the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is
the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training,
and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is
denied the opportunity of an education. Such an
opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide
it, is a right which must be made available to all on
equal terms.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
10. For example, National PTA President Shirley Igo contends that
"[v]ouchers divert funds from public schools that are already inadequately
funded." Ctr. for Educ. Reform, supra note 5.
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I. ZELMAN V. SIMMONS-HARRIS: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF USING
EDUCATIONAL VOUCHERS TO PAY FOR PAROCHIAL EDUCATION

A.

Background

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris arose out of a First Amendment
challenge to the Ohio Voucher Program," a program created in the
midst of a mismanagement crisis in the Cleveland public schools.
In 1996, the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Ohio, declaring a financial "crisis of magnitude," ordered the
Cleveland School District to submit to the supervision of the State
Superintendent of Public Instruction.' 2 On the heels of this court
order, the state auditor made a similar declaration: the Cleveland
public schools were suffering a "crisis that is perhaps
unprecedented in the history of American education."' 3 By all
accounts, the district was simply failing to educate its students,
meeting none of the eighteen minimal acceptable performance
standards required by the state.' 4 Only one in every ten ninth
graders passed basic proficiency examinations.' 5 Students at all
levels performed significantly below students in other Ohio public
schools. 16 More than two-thirds of high school students either
dropped or failed out.' 7 Of those students who did make it to their
senior years, one in four still failed to graduate; and yet, students
were graduating who could not read, write, or perform basic
mathematical computations.' 8 In response, Ohio enacted
its Pilot
19
initiatives.
other
with
along
Project Scholarship Program,
The Pilot Project Scholarship Program provides financial
assistance to families in any Ohio school district that either is or
11. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000), revd.,
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S.Ct. 2460 (2002).
12. Reed v. Rhodes, 934 F. Supp. 1533, 1560 (N.D. Ohio 1996).
13. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2463 (quoting Cleveland City School District
Performance Audit 2-1 (Mar. 1996)).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Zelman, 122 S.Ct. at 2463.
19. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.974-.979 (Anderson 2002).
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has been "under federal court order requiring supervision and
operational management of the district by the state
superintendent." 20 Only the Cleveland City School District is
currently eligible. 2 1 This financial assistance can come in the form
of either tuition aid to participating public
or private schools or
2
2
students.
school
public
for
aid
tutorial
B.

Tuition Aid and True Private Choice

It was Cleveland's tuition aid program that provoked the
constitutional challenge in Zelman. Under the Cleveland program,
a limited number of Cleveland City School District students are
selected for tuition aid through a process based partially on
financial need.23 Checks are made out to the parents, but are sent
directly to private schools, where the parents are required to
endorse the checks over to the schools. 24 Significantly, during the
1999-2000 school year, parents of at least 96% of the participating
students signed their checks over to religious schools. 25 Although
parents could also choose to send their children to public schools
in neighboring school districts that would accept the vouchers, no

20. § 3313.975(A).

21. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2463.
22. The Ohio statute provides that
[t]he superintendent of public instruction shall establish
a pilot project scholarship program and shall include in
such program any school districts that are or have ever
been under federal court order requiring supervision
and operational management of the district by the state
superintendent. The program shall provide for a
number of students residing in any such district to
receive scholarships to attend alternative schools, and
for an equal number of students to receive tutorial
assistance grants while attending public school in any

such district.
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.975(A) (Anderson 2002).
23. Id.
24. § 3313.979.
25. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2464.
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neighboring schools districts had chosen to participate as of the
1999-2000 school year.2 6
Under Zelman, the key to a voucher program's
constitutionality is its provision of a "true private choice" in which
government aid reaches religious schools only as a result of the
genuine and independent choices of private individuals. 27 The
Court reasoned that so long as the decision to use the benefit at a
religious school "is reasonably attributable to the individual
recipient, not to the government, whose role ends with the
disbursement of benefits," the government could not be said to
have violated the Establishment Clause.28 More precisely, the
Court emphasized three criteria for determining whether a decision
to use a benefit at a religious school is one of "true private choice."
First, the program must be "neutral" towards religion. 29 Second,
any monies flowing to religious schools must flow through the
decisions of individuals rather than as direct payments from the
state. 30 Third, the program must offer
parents genuine secular
3
options for their children's schooling. '
26. Id.
27. Id. at 2465-67.
28. Id. at 2467.
29. The Zelman Court discussed three cases-Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S.
388 (1983), Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481
(1986), and Zobrest v. CatalinaFoothills School Dist., 509 U.S. I (1993)-and
stated that "[t]hree times we have confronted Establishment Clause challenges
to neutral government programs that provide aid directly to a broad class of
individuals, who, in turn, direct the aid to religious schools or institutions of
their own choosing. Three times we have rejected such challenges." Zelman,
122 S. Ct. at 2466. The Court concluded that the program challenged in Zelman
"is a program of true private choice, consistent with Mueller, Witters, and
Zobrest, and thus constitutional" because it "is neutral in all respects toward
religion." Id. at 2467; see also Pew Forum, supranote 8, at 3.
30. See discussion supra note 29. The portion of the Court's decision
quoted there also demonstrates the Court's concern that government aid be
directed to "institutions of [individuals'] choosing." Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2466.
The Court highlighted the distinction that it has drawn between two types of
government programs. Id at 2465. The first are "government programs that
provide aid directly to religious schools." Id. (citing Mitchell v. Helms, 530
U.S. 793, 841-44 (2000), Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 225-27 (1997), and
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 842 (1995)).
The second are programs "of true private choice, in which government aid
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Although these criteria provide a basic framework for
determining whether a voucher program violates the federal

Constitution's Establishment Clause, they leave unanswered a
pressing set of concerns with which states must contend when
32
contemplating the creation of educational voucher programs.

States must consider (1) whether their own state constitutions
permit the provision of voucher benefits to religious schools, 33 (2)

whether it is constitutional to exclude religious schools from
participation in a voucher program,34 (3) whether government may
impose restrictions on religious schools as a condition of receiving
state funding through vouchers,35 and (4) whether the federal
Constitution permits or compels exemptions from such regulations
for religious schools in the interest of protecting the free exercise
of religion.36 These issues are explored in Section V. In order to
frame these issues in a concrete context, the next section
introduces the educational history and policy of the author's home
state, North Carolina.

reaches religious schools only as a result of the genuine and independent choices
of private individuals." Id. at 2465 (citing Mueller, 463 U.S. 388, Witters, 474
U.S 481, and Zobrest, 509 U.S. 1); see also Pew Forum, supra note 8 at 4
("Although the point is not at issue in Zelman, it is important to emphasize that
the majority's approval extends only to programs in which aid reaches schools
because of the 'independent choices of private individuals'-as opposed to
'programs that provide aid directly [from the government] to religious
schools.' "(quoting Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2465)).
31. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2473 (characterizing the Cleveland program as
one that permits "genuine choice among options public and private, secular and
religious").
32. See Pew Forum, supranote 8, at 7.
33. See Pew Forum, supra note 8, at 7. ("More than two-thirds of the
states have constitutional provisions that restrict aid to religious organizations
more explicitly than does the Establishment Clause.").
34. See Pew Forum, supranote 8, at 8.
35. See Pew Forum, supra note 8, at 9.
36. See Pew Forum, supra note 8, at 10-11.
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I. NORTH CAROLINA: A REVOLVING DOOR FOR NEW
SCHOOLING IDEAS

North Carolina has failed to provide a sound basic
education to thousands of its children. 37 Groping through decades
of reform, North Carolina has been fervently seeking mechanisms
to serve students at risk for academic failure. 38 Indeed, a 1997
Report Card on the Condition Of Public Education in the States
asserts that "[if] any state could be faulted for trying too hard to
improve schools, it's North Carolina." 39 This report characterizes
the North Carolina legislature as a "virtual revolving door for new
schooling ideas, 'A its reform tactics as "zigzag [in] nature, ' 41 and
37. On remand from the landmark North Carolina case, Leandro v. State,
346 N.C. 336, 347, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (1997), the Wake County Superior
Court had this to say about the state of education in North Carolina:
Leandro's guarantee is only one of equal opportunity
to obtain a sound basic education. However, the
numbers of students whose performance on the ABCs
EOG and EOC tests show that they are failing to obtain
a sound basic education, combined with the other
credible evidence in the record, constitutes [sic] strong
evidence that the equal opportunity to obtain a sound
basic education is not being provided to at-risk children
throughout North Carolina.
The State cannot escape or deny the
importance of the ABC system as proof of the failure
of thousands of students to obtain a sound basic
education by failing to perform at or above grade level
all the way through high school.
Hoke County Bd. Of Educ. v. North Carolina, at 78, 96 (Wake Co. Super. Ct.,
April 4, 2002) (unpublished memorandum of decision on file with the First
Amendment Law Review), availableat
http://www.ncforum.org/pdf/Hoke Part4.pdf.
38. Random Acts of Reform, in XVI EDUC. WKLY. 177 (supplement to
volume XVI dated Jan. 22, 1997, in collaboration with Pew Charitable Trust)
[hereinafter Random Acts].
39. The report went on to assert that "[o]ver the past dozen years,
whenever education reformers have hatched a new idea, Tarheel leaders have
stepped up to give it a test spin." Random Acts, supra note 38, at 177.
40. Random Acts, supranote 38, at 177.
41. Random Acts, supranote 38, at 177.
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its approach to new ideas as "stop-and-start.
The following
discussion of North Carolina's revolving educational policies
places North Carolina in the center of swirling educational reforms
to which Zelman's roadmap may give some future direction.
In the decade preceding this report, North Carolina had
adopted three major pieces of legislation aimed at improving the
quality of education in the state. The first, the Basic Education
Plan adopted in 1986, "start[ed] North Carolina on the road toward
a uniform state curriculum. 'A3
The second, the School
44
Improvement and Accountability Act, adopted in 1989, required
that the State Board of Education create a performance-based
accountability program.45 While this program focused on
performance goals set by local school districts, participation by the
local districts was voluntary. 46 However, by 1993, all students
were required to take the end-of-grade (EOG) or end-of-course47
(EOC) tests developed by the State Board in response to this Act.
The third, the ABC's of Education Act,48 adopted in 1995, required
local schools and school districts to participate in educational
reforms. These reforms included pursuing school-specific annual
performance goals set by the State Board, publicizing the annual
performance of students in each school, rewarding or penalizing
administrators and teachers (both financially and professionally)
42. Random Acts, supra note 38, at 177.
43. John Charles Boger, Education's 'Perfect Storm?' Racial
Resegregation, 'High Stakes' Testing, & School Resource Inequities: The Case
ofNorth Carolina,81 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2003) (manuscript at 104,

on file with author) ("North Carolina laid its foundation for an accountability
approach in 1986, by adopting a comprehensive Basic Education Plan ('BEP')
that specified uniform curricular and other input standards for all elementary and
secondary schools.").

44. School Improvement and Accountability Act of 1989, ch. 778, sec. 3,
1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 2799 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C105.20 to -105.35 (2002)).
45. For a discussion of performance indicators set by the school districts,
see Boger, supranote 43 (manuscript at 105 n. 185, on file with author).

46. See Boger, supranote 43 at 105 n. 185.
47. See Boger, supranote 43 at 105.
48. The ABC's of Education Act of 1995, ch. 716, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws
352 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-105.35 to -105.39
(2002)).
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based on the performance of students in individual schools, and
empowering site-based school improvement committees.49
Since the 1997 report, North Carolina has persisted in its
educational innovation, scrambling to bring student achievement
up to national standards. In 1997, Chief Justice Burley Mitchell,
writing for the North Carolina Supreme Court in Leandro v. State,
concluded that the North Carolina Constitution "guarantee[s] every
child of this state an opportunity to receive a sound basic education
in our public schools." 50 That same year, the General Assembly
passed the Excellent Schools Act,5 1 which focused on improving
teacher quality by passing statutes that increased the scrutiny
applied to teacher certification, streamlining the process for teacher
dismissal, assessing the general knowledge of teachers at low
performing schools, and providing bonuses for teachers in schools
that achieved
or surpassed the goals set under the ABC's
52
program.
In 2001, EOG scores became more than measures of
success: they began to dictate whether or not children were
promoted in key grades known as "gateways". 53 As a result, the
State Board of Education requires that any student who does not
pass be provided a "personal education plan"54-a significant
49. Id.
50. 346 N.C. 336, 347, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (1997).
51. Excellent Schools Act of 1997, ch. 221, 1997 N.C. Sess. Laws 427
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-105.35 to -105.44 (2002)).
52. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-105.39 (2002).
53. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, r. 6D.0502 (Nov. 2002) (establishing
grades three, five, eight, and twelve as "gateways" through which students
normally cannot pass without passing the EOG tests).
54. Strategies for, and components of, personal education plans are set
forth in the applicable regulations as follows:
Students who do not meet promotion standards shall
have personalized education plans with the following
components:
diagnostic evaluation, intervention
strategies, and monitoring strategies. Strategies may
include, but are not limited to, alternative learning
models, special homework, smaller classes, tutorial
session, extended school day, Saturday school,

modified instructional programs, parental involvement,
summer school instruction, or retention.

FIRSTAMENDMENTLA WREVIEW

96

[Vol. 1

substantive educational requirement. The year 2001 was also
significant for public education in North Carolina because of the
holdings in the Leandro case on remand." In that year, "the Court
determined that the at-risk children in North Carolina were not
obtaining a sound basic education and that the reason appeared to
be the lack of a coordinated, effective educational strategy for atrisk children statewide. "56 It also ordered the state to "conduct selfexaminations of the present allocation of resources and to produce
a rational ... comprehensive plan which strategically focuses
available resources and funds towards meeting the needs of all
children, including at-risk children, to obtain a sound 57basic
education.... The system and allocation should be flexible."
In requiring the state to refocus currently available
resources, the Court declined to find a need for greater funding
from the State for the educational programs currently in place.N
Nonetheless, many state leaders, led by Governor Mike Easley and
concerned about funding for educational programming, hoped to
secure revenue for education from a state lottery.5 Governor
Easley had said he would use lottery profits to cut class size in
public schools and create a preschool program called "More At
Four.",60 But the lottery bill failed to make it out of the House of
Representatives, 6 1 leaving Governor Easley with no obvious source
of funding (as of yet) for new educational programming.
N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, r. 6D.0505(c) (Nov. 2002).
55. On remand from the Leandro case, the Wake County Superior Court
issued several separate memoranda of opinion, all of which were eventually
incorporated into its April 2002 final judgment. Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v.
North Carolina (Wake Co. Super. Ct., April 4, 2002), available at
http://www.ncforum.org/pdf/HokePart4.pdf (unpublished memorandum of
decision on file with the First Amendment Law Review). For the sake of
simplicity, only the April 2002 final judgment is cited in this Note.
56. Id. at 6 (explaining the March 2001 decision).
57. Id. at 9.
58. Id. at 7 ("Merely throwing more money into the pot does not satisfy
the Constitutional [sic] requirement that the children be provided an equal
opportunity. It's how the resources are allocated that count [sic].").
59. Eric Dyer, House Handily Kills Lottery Vote, GREENSBORO NEWS AND
REC., Sept. 18, 2002, at Al.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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Perhaps most importantly, in an effort to provide more
choices to parents better serve students at risk of academic failure,
North Carolina has been experimenting with charter schools. 62 In
1996, the General Assembly passed the North Carolina Charter
Schools Act.63

The first thirty-four charter schools opened in

1997. 64

The statute limits the number of charters that may be
issued to "no more than 100 charter schools statewide," at least for
the time being. 65 While the statutory purposes display a list of
laudable educational goals, 66 the Board of Education, in the

62. Charter schools are publicly funded, locally controlled schools that are
created by statute and run by non-profit organizations. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 11 5C-238.29E(a) (2002) ("A charter school that is approved by the State shall
be a public school within the local administrative unit in which it is located.");
N.C. Dept. of Pub. Instruction, 2003 Charter School Application Resource
Manual 3 ("Charter schools provide parents a public school choice in the
education of their children. As with other public schools in North Carolina,
state education dollars are the primary funding sources for charter schools."),
availableat

http://www.ncpublicschools.org/charter schools/manual/applicationguide2003/a
pplicationguide.pdf (Aug. 28, 2002) (on file with the First Amendment Law
Review); see also infra notes 115-21 and accompanying text.
63. The Charter Schools Act of 1996, ch. 731, § 1, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws
424, 424 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-238.29A-K (2002)).
64. N.C. Dept. of Pub. Instruction, 2003 Charter School Application
Resource Manual, supranote 62, at 3.
65. The numeric cap is presently codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §

115C-

238.29D(b) (2002). A bill pending before the House Committee on Education
as of March 12, 2003, however, would remove this numerical limit altogether.
H.B. 32, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2003-2004); available at
http://www.ncleg.net/html2003/bills/CurrentVersion/house/hbilOO32.full.html.
66. The goals of the Charter School Act of 1996 are set out in its statement
of purpose:
The purpose of this Part is to authorize a system of
charter schools to provide opportunities for teachers,
parents, pupils, and community members to establish
and maintain schools that operate independently of
existing schools, as a method to accomplish all of the
following:
(1) Improve student learning;
(2) Increase learning opportunities for all
students, with special emphasis on expanded
learning experiences for students who are
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materials accompanying applications for a charter, focuses
primarily on the concept of educational choice, 67 a policy
preference that closely aligns charter schools with voucher
programs. This particular choice has been attractive to many
parents: by 2001, the state had received 271 applications for
charters, and ninety-nine charter schools were approved by the
beginning of the 2001-2002 school year. 68 There were over 15,000
students
enrolled in charter schools during the 2000-2001 school
69
year.
So here stands North Carolina: proceeding under a stateconstitutional mandate to provide a sound basic education,
measuring achievement with high-stakes testing, having been
ordered to focus resources on meeting the needs of all, but
especially at-risk, children, losing the governor's hope of lottery
revenue, and permitting thousands of students every year to
exercise "educational choice" by attending charter schools. For all
these reasons, North Carolina is ripe for educational innovation,
including reform efforts, like Cleveland's, that place greater hope

identified as at risk of academic failure or
academically gifted;

(3) Encourage the use of different and innovative
teaching methods;
(4) Create new professional opportunities for

teachers, including the opportunities to be
responsible for the learning program at the school
site;
(5) Provide parents and students with expanded
choices in the types of educational opportunities
that are available within the public school system;
and

(6) Hold the schools established under this Part
accountable for meeting measurable student
achievement results, and provide the schools with
a method to change from rule-based to
performance-based accountability systems.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-238.29A (2002).
67. N.C. Dept. of Pub. Instruction, 2003 Charter School Application
Resource Manual, supranote 62.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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in outsourcing the education of the state's children than in
resurrecting a failing public school system.
Indeed, Zelman has already begun to energize the voucher
and charter school movements in North Carolina. Lindalyn
Kakadelis, a former teacher and school board member and
currently the director of the North Carolina Education Alliance, a
pro-voucher and pro-charter school organization, made this
statement after Zelman was decided:
Educational freedom is the new civil right,
and now the nation's highest court has opened
the door for state initiatives to achieve it ....
The legal issues are now resolved. Public
education means a complete spectrum of all
educational providers, not just one monopoly
of government schools called public
education. When schools compete - kids win!
As in Cleveland, communities in North
Carolina should be able to offer scholarship
assistance to disadvantaged children so they
can get70 the sound, basic education they
deserve.
As this statement reveals, there is now a perception among at least
some North Carolina activists that Zelman has flung the door wide
open for state funding of private educational services. North
Carolinians opposed to public funding of parochial education
might wonder how that door may be at least partially closed.
III. PUBLIC FUNDING OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND THE
NORTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTION

Although state constitutions often provide stricter
prohibitions on the establishment of religion than does the federal
Constitution,7' the North Carolina Constitution decidedly does
70. Press Release, N.C. Educ. Alliance, Supreme Court Takes Gigantic
Step in Education Reform (Nov. 2002) (on file with the First Amendment Law
Review).
71. Pew Forum, supranote 8, at 7.
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not.72 More than two-thirds of state constitutions contain some
form of explicit restriction on the establishment of religion or the
public funding of religious schools. 73 Many of these controversial
provisions are classified as "Blaine Amendments," a group of state
constitutional provisions that are similar textually and historically
to a failed amendment to the Federal Constitution that was
introduced by James G. Blaine of Maine in 1875. 74 In states that
have Blaine Amendments, public money is constitutionally
prohibited from reaching religious schools. 7 Blaine Amendments

are often criticized for being the product of nineteenth century anti-

72. Indeed, North Carolina's religious liberty clause does not contain a
provision analogous to the federal Constitution's Establishment Clause.
Compare N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 13 ("All persons have a natural and inalienable
right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own
consciences, and no human authority shall, in any case whatever, control or
interfere with the rights of conscience."), with U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof.").
73. Pew Forum, supra note 8, at 7.
74. See Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake: School Choice, the First
Amendment, and State ConstitutionalLaw, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 657,
670-75 (1998) [hereinafter Viteritti, Blaine's Wake). The text of the proposed
Blaine Amendment read:
No state shall make any law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in
any State for the support of public schools, or derived
from any public fund therefor, nor any public lands
devoted thereto, shall ever be under the control of any
religious sect; nor shall any money so raised or lands
so devoted be divided between religious sects and
denominations.
Id. at 671 n.64 (citing LLOYD P. JORGENSON, THE STATE AND THE NON-PUBLIC
SCHOOL, 1825-1925, at 138-39 (1987)).
75. See Viteritti, Blaine's Wake, supra note 74, at 673 ("Blaine's presence
seems to have been felt throughout ... deliberations [about States' rules of
governance]. By 1876, fourteen States had enacted legislation prohibiting the
use of public funds for religious schools; by 1890, twenty-nine States had
incorporated such provisions into their constitutions.") (footnote omitted).
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Catholic sentiment, 76 a historical pedigree that suggests to some
that they may violate the Free Exercise Clause.77
Following Zelman, Blaine Amendments have been pushed
into the forefront of constitutional debate surrounding the public
funding of religious education. In the post-Zelman legal climate,
state leaders concerned with protecting the integrity of public
education funds against depletion by vouchers must either rely on
these state constitutional provisions or attempt to distinguish
programs proposed in their states from the program found to be
constitutional in Zelman.
North Carolina's Constitution,
containing no Blaine Amendment, provides weak protection at best
against the establishment of religion.
In the North Carolina Constitution, religion is addressed
primarily in the preamble and in Article 1, Rights and Privileges.
Education is addressed primarily in Article 1, Rights and
Privileges, and Article IX, Education. All of these provisions
expressly acknowledge God as a sovereign or create space for
religion in the public sphere, 78 and no provision in the North
76. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828-29 (2000) (plurality
opinion by Thomas, J.) ("Opposition to aid to 'sectarian' schools acquired
prominence in the 1870's with [the proposed] Blaine Amendment .... [This
proposal] arose at a time of pervasive hostility to the Catholic Church and to
Catholics in general, and it was an open secret that 'sectarian' was code for
Catholic.") (citation omitted); see also, Heytens, supra note 2, at 138. However,
state constitutional provisions which limit state funding of religious education
are not necessarily Blaine Amendments. For a list of competing assessments of
the number of Blaine amendments found in state constitutions, see Heytens,
supra note 2, at 138 n.32.
77. For a detailed analysis, see Heytens, supra note 2; Viteritti, Blaine's
Wake, supra note 74, at 681-99; Frank R. Kemerer, State Constitutions and
School Vouchers, 120 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 20-39 (1997); Linda S. Wendtland,
Note, Beyond the Establishment Clause: Enforcing the Separation of Church
and State Through State ConstitutionalProvisions, 71 VA. L. REV. 625, 638-42
(1985).
78. The Preamble, overtly religious in its assertion of dependence on God,
includes the phrases "grateful to Almighty God, the Sovereign Ruler of Nations,
for the preservation of the American Union and the existence of our civil,
political and religious liberties," and "acknowledging our dependence upon Him
for the continuance of those blessings to us and our posterity." N.C. CONST.
pmbl. Nothing in this declaration of purpose indicates a hesitation to lend state
support to a religious organization. See also N.C. CONST. art. 1, §§ 13, 15.
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Carolina Constitution articulates a protection against the
establishment of religion. 79 Moreover, no provision expressly
restricts governmental aid to religious organizations. 80
Article 1, Section 13 addresses Religious Liberty. This
provision promises that "[a]ll persons have a natural and
inalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the
dictates of their own consciences, and no human authority shall, in
any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of
conscience. '' 8 1 Clearly, this provision is significantly different
from the religious liberty provision of the federal Constitution.
Although it echoes the free exercise clause of the federal
Constitution in its guarantee of the right to worship God, it does
not provide a concrete guard against the establishment of religion
by the state.82 Thus, the religious liberty clause of the North
Carolina Constitution would pose no obstacle beyond that posed
by the Federal Constitution to an educational program providing
for educational vouchers to religious schools. Nor would North
Carolina's constitutional provisions concerning education provide
any independent obstacle to a voucher program like that adopted
by the Cleveland school system.
Education is paradoxically both a right and a privilege in
North Carolina. Article 1, Section 15 promises that "[t]he people
have a right to the privilege of education, and it is the duty of the
State to guard and maintain that right." 83 This is the entirety of the
promise to the right of an education. On its face, it does not
guarantee that the education must be public, non-sectarian, or even
free.

79. See N.C. CONST.
80. Id.
81. N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 13.
82. See JOHN V. ORTH, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION, A
REFERENCE GUIDE 49 (G. Alan Tarr, ed. 1993) ("North Carolina today lacks a
specific prohibition of 'an establishment of religion,' such as in the First
Amendment in the U.S. Bill of Rights; nonetheless, the state supreme court has
construed this section along with the First Amendment to require 'secular
neutrality toward religion.'" (quoting Heritage Village Church & Missionary

Fellowship, Inc. v. State, 299 N.C. 399, 263 S.E.2d 726 (1980))).
83. N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 15.

2003]

POST-ZELMAN EDUCATIONAL REFORM

103

Nor does Article IX, Education, articulate a prohibition
against the use of state money at religious or sectarian schools.
84
Indeed, the very first word in Article IX, Section 1 is "Religion."
Specifically, this section states: "Religion, morality, and
knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness
of mankind, schools, libraries, and the means of education shall
forever be encouraged." 85 While the language of this section does
not explicitly advocate the funding of religious education, it seems
to be in line with the Religious Liberty clause in its deliberate
creation of space for religion, and its noticeable absence of an
articulate protection against the establishment of religion.
On the other hand, and despite the absence of language
forbidding the funding of religious or sectarian schools, Article IX
does use the phrase "[f]ree public school(s)" on five separate
occasions in its first seven sections. 86 Arguably, this signifies a
commitment on some level to a school system functioning without
the bolster of private religious schools. This commitment is also
echoed in North Carolina's current choice to utilize charter
schools, rather than vouchers, as a public alternative to traditional
public schools.87 Yet without a state constitutional commitment to
keep public education funds from reaching religious schools,
educational alternatives in this state are left to the whims of
legislation-a process that has now been freed by the Court's

84. N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
85. Id.
86. N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2(1) ("The General Assembly shall provide by
taxation and otherwise for a general and uniform system of free public
schools....") (emphasis added); N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2(2) ("The General

Assembly may assign to units of local government such responsibility for the
financial support of the free public schools as it may deem appropriate.")
(emphasis added); N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 5 ("The State Board of Education shall
supervise and administer the free public school system and the educational funds
provided for its support ... .") (emphasis added); N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 6
("exclusively for establishing and maintaining a uniform system offree public
schools") (emphasis added); N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 7 ("exclusively for
maintainingfree public schools") (emphasis added).

87. The commitment is implicit in the fact that charter schools are
fundamentally public institutions. See supra note 62; infra notes 115-21 and
accompanying text.
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decision in Zelman to allow state monies to reach religious schools
in some circumstances.
In summary, North Carolina is ripe for educational reform,
Zelman establishes that the Establishment clause is not necessarily
an obstacle to vouchers that fund education at religious schools,
and the North Carolina Constitution provides no further obstacle to
funding educational alternatives that include religious schools.

Moreover, North Carolina is currently investing energy and
resources into charter school programs rather than vouchers. 88
Given this set of circumstances, a significant question arises:
under the Zelman analysis, could North Carolina choose to charter
schools that have a religious focus without offending the federal
Constitution's Establishment Clause?
IV. NORTH CAROLINA CHARTER SCHOOLS WITH A RELIGIOUS
Focus?
Although there are many ways in which North Carolina's
Charter School program could be made to look like the Zelman
program, there remains the reality that charter schools are state
schools, which have historically been disallowed from endorsing
religion. 89 Similarly, although there is much opposition to charter

88. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
89. Although the Court's decision in Zelman authorizes some indirect
public funding of religious education, the Court has consistently held that public
schools themselves cannot endorse religion by teaching or engaging in the
practices of a particular faith community. For instance, in 1963, the Supreme
Court found unconstitutional the practice of reading the Bible in public schools
before classes, stating,
The place of religion in our society is an exalted one,
achieved through a long tradition of reliance on the
home, the church and the inviolable citadel of the
individual heart and mind. We have come to recognize
through bitter experience that it is not within the power
of government to invade that citadel, whether its
purpose or effect be to aid or oppose, to advance or
retard. In the relationship between man and religion,
the State is firmly committed to a position of neutrality.
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schools and the money that they draw away from established
public schools and the children that are left in them, 90 North
Carolina's nod in their direction may be the best hope for keeping
public school money from funding education at religious schools.
An easy response to the question of whether North Carolina
could charter religious schools would be a reminder that the state
statues creating charter schools specifically require that "a charter
school shall be nonsectarian in its programs, admission policies,
employment practices, and all other operations ...[and] shall not
be affiliated with a nonpublic sectarian school or religious
institution." 91 But a statutory mandate such as this is subject to the
Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963). More than two decades later,
the Court struck nearly the same chord when addressing school prayer in
Wallace v. Jaffree,472 U.S. 38 (1985). In Wallace, the Court reasoned that
[t]he legislature enacted § 16-1-20.1, despite the
existence of § 16-1-20 for the sole purpose of
expressing the State's endorsement of prayer activities
for one minute at the beginning of each schoolday.
The addition of "or voluntary prayer" indicates that the
State intended to characterize prayer as a favored
practice. Such an endorsement is not consistent with
the established principle that the government must
pursue a course of complete neutrality toward religion.
Id. at 60 (footnote omitted); see also Epperson v. Arkansas, 93 U.S. 97, 109
(1968); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 215-22; Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430
(1962) ("Neither the fact that the prayer may be denominationally neutral nor
the fact that its observance on the part of the students is voluntary can serve to
free it from the limitations of the Establishment Clause.").
90. For instance, the National PTA statement on Charter Schools states,
Some public education advocates are concerned that
putting too much money into charter schools will
create a two-tier education system. Many charter
schools are niche schools that serve particular interest
groups; therefore, there is a concern that charter
schools will divert money and attention from
traditional public schools. Still others point to some
charter schools that neglect special education students,
have selective admissions processes, and breach the
separation of church and state.
National PTA, CharterSchools, at
http://www.pta.org/ptawashington/issues/charter.asp (last visited Feb. 22, 2003).
91. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-238.29F(b) (2002).
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fickle passions of shifting legislative majorities. Because the
North Carolina Constitution does not pose any greater obstacle to
funding educational alternatives that include religious schools than
does the federal Constitution, the Zelman analysis will control any
such attempt.
The Zelman analysis suggests that North Carolina could
charter schools with a religious focus without offending the
Establishment Clause.
Because under Zelman, a voucher
program's provision of a true choice of schools where the benefit
can be used is the key to a program's constitutionality, 92 it is
significant that two of the purposes articulated in North Carolina's
charter statutes are (1) "[i]ncreas[ing] learning opportunities for all
students, with special emphasis on expanded learning experiences
for students who are identified as at risk of academic failure or
academically gifted" 93 and (2) provision to parents and students of
"expanded choices in the types of educational opportunities that
are available within the public school system." 94 Charter schools
were created in North Carolina in order to provide educational
choices for those whom public schools are not serving. This is
similar to the stated purpose of the Ohio voucher program. 95 Thus,
it is worthwhile to examine North Carolina's charter school
program in light of the Zelman criteria.
The first criterion is that the program must be neutral
toward religion. In Zelman, this criterion was met when the
beneficiaries (the students) and the eligible institutions (the
schools) were "defined without reference to religion" 96 such that
92. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
93. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-238.29A(2) (2002).
94. § 115C-238.29A(5).
95. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in Zelman, stated that "[t]he
state of Ohio has established a pilot program designed to provide educational
choices to families with children who reside in the Cleveland City School
District." Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S.Ct. 2460, 2462 (2002). However,

the program set forth in Zelman is only applicable to school districts that are, or
have been "under federal court order requiring supervision and operational
management of the district by the state superintendent." OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3313-975(A) (2002).
96. Zelman, 122 S.Ct. at 2467 (2002) (quoting Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1,8 (1993)).
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religious recipients and secular recipients were subject to the same
terms.9 7 Neutrality should, therefore, be easy for North Carolina's
charter school program to demonstrate:
only the language
prohibiting the chartering of sectarian schools need be removed.
Furthermore, although the specific voucher program analyzed in
Zelman actually offered less money to private schools, the Court
made it clear that "such features of the program are not necessary
to its constitutionality."9 8 Therefore, assessing only the issue of
funding, North Carolina can presumably provide an equal amount
of money, at least up to the per-pupil cost of education, to charter
schools with a religious focus, and still be operating with the
requisite neutrality.
The Court's second criterion for determining "true private
choice" is that any monies flowing to religious schools must flow
through the decisions of individuals rather than proceed as direct
payments from the state. In Zelman, this criterion was met even
though government checks were mailed directly to participating
99
schools because the checks were made out to individual parents.
Two important aspects of this requirement have been established in
a previous case. 0 0 One is that direct aid can be given to religious
schools only in the form of materials and equipment that are used
for secular purposes.' 0' A second is that the state cannot
provide
02
basis.'
per-pupil
a
on
even
schools
religious
to
direct aid
This criterion makes the funding of religious charter
schools unconstitutional under the current funding scheme, but it
also draws a roadmap for the creation of a funding scheme that
honors "true private choice." North Carolina charter schools
currently receive both state and local funds on a per pupil basis.
State funds are distributed to each charter school according to the
97. Pew Forum, supra note 8, at 4, 11.
98. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2468.
99. Id. at 2464.
100. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 840 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment). This concurrence supported Mitchell's holding on
the narrowest grounds, and provided the votes necessary to obtain a majority.
101. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Pew Forum,
supra note 8, at 4 n.9.
102. Id. at 842 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (indicating that
a per-pupil formula is not parallel to parental choice).
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"average per pupil allocation for average daily membership for the
local school administrative unit allotments in which the charter
school is located,"' 3 with additional funds provided for students
with special needs 10 4 or limited English proficiency.'0 5 Local
funds are distributed from the school district in which a child
resides to a charter school "in an amount equal to the per pupil
local current expense appropriation
to the local school
' 6
administrative unit for the fiscal year. 10
Thus, to align itself with the private-choice funding
scenario that the Supreme Court found to be constitutional in
Zelman, the government would only have to make these payments
in the form of checks made out to the parents of children attending
the charter school, rather than the charter school itself. Once
again, this is a change that could be made easily by North
Carolina's General Assembly.
Significantly, although a charter school is not allowed to
charge tuition, a charter school's funding is not limited to that
provided by the state or local government. Rather, "private
persons and organizations" are also "encouraged to provide
funding and other assistance to the establishment or operation of
charter schools.' 1°7 There is no prohibition against receiving finds
from churches or private parachurch 0 8 organizations. There is
also no prohibition against physically locating a charter school in a
church building. The line between charter schools and religious
schools is already a thin one.

103. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-238.29H(a)(1) (2002).
104. § 115C-238.29H(a)(2).

105. § 115C-238.29H(a)(3).
106. § 115C-238.29H(b).
107. § 115C-238.29J(b).
108. "Parachurch" organizations can be understood narrowly as religious
organizations that exist outside of established religious bodies, or more broadly
as any organizations that work as partners in ministry with religious groups.
Compare Jeffrey K. Hadden, ParachurchOrganizations,at
http://religiousbroadcasting.lib.virginia.edu/parachurch.html
(July 8, 1999)
(adopting the broader definition) with Hartford Institute for Religion Research,
Articles on ParachurchGroups, at
http://hirr.hartsem.edu/org/faith_parachurcharticles.html (last visited Feb. 22,
2003) (adopting the narrower definition).
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The Court's third criterion for determining "true private
choice" is that the program must offer parents genuine secular
options for their children's schooling. The Court held that this
criterion was met in Zelman even though 82 percent of the
participating private schools were religious and 96 percent 0of9
participating students were enrolled in religious schools.'
Demonstrating genuine secular options should, therefore, be a
relatively easy task for North Carolina charter schools to
accomplish. Although the decision in Zelman did emphasize that
the constitutionality of a program cannot be based on actual
percentages of aid," 0 an analysis similar to Zelman should allow at
least eighty-two of the one hundred charter schools currently
allowed by statute to be religious and still find that non-religious
charter schools were sufficiently available."
In addition to considering the availability of non-religious
private schools, Justice O'Connor's crucial concurrence in Zelman
highlights the fact that parents could choose to send their children
to magnet public schools and community schools, adjacent public
school districts (none of which had agreed to accept voucher
students by 2002), or regular public schools, all the while
benefiting from the tutorial aid available to all students under the
voucher legislation.' 2 While North Carolina does not offer
general supplemental tutorial aid, all counties do have public
schools that are functioning under the ABC's of Education Act and
its mandatory educational reforms, including the personal
education plan that must be provided to any student who does not
pass end of grade tests." 3 In addition, many of the larger counties
have magnet schools that offer the choice to focus on specific areas

109. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2464 (2002).
110. Id. at 2470.

111. As noted above, the statutory cap on charter schools in North
Carolina may soon be lifted. See supra note 65. Presumably, this would mean
that even greater percentages of charter schools could conceivably have a
religious focus, provided that whatever secular options did exist provided
adequate secular alternatives under the Zelman standard.
112. Id. at 2473 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
113. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
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of study. 114 North Carolina's public schools would thus certainly
satisfy Justice O'Connor's concern that all secular options be
considered in a determination of the presence of true secular
choice.
Yet the compelling argument remains that charter schools
are public state schools, which cannot also be sectarian schools.
First, the charter school statute itself expressly defines charter
schools as "public school[s]." 15 Second, the legal status of charter
schools is in many ways similar or identical to that of traditional
public schools. For example, the local school board maintains
authority over a charter school for ensuring compliance with
applicable laws and provisions of the charter. 16 The State Board
of Education sets the amount and type of liability insurance that
the directors of a charter school must obtain.'" 7 The State Board of
Education requires student assessments for all children and
compliance with state policies for the education of special needs
children.t8 The state requires that a certain percentage of teachers
be certified."19 Perhaps most importantly, although the statutes
specify that an employee of a charter school is not an employee of
the local school system, 120 in an odd twist, they are considered to
2
be employees for insurance, retirement, and employee benefits.' '
114. Information about the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Magnet programs is

available at the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system's official website at
http://www.cms.kl2.nc.us/programs/MagnetThemeMenu.asp.
Information
about Guilford County magnet programs is available at the Guilford County
school system's official website at
http://www.guilford.kl2.nc.us/magnet-schools/index.htm. Wake County's list
of magnet school programs is available at the Wake County school system's
official website at http://www.wcpss.net/lnstructional/Magnet. These are the
only three North Carolina counties that have implemented magnet school
programs.
115. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-238.29E(a) (2002) ("A charter school that is
approved by the State shall be a public school within the local administrative
unit in which it is located.").
116. § 115C-238.29E(a).
117. § 115C-238.29F(c)(1).
118. § 115C-238.29F(d)(3-4).

119. § 115C-238.29F(e)(I).
120. Id.

121. § 115C-238.29F(e)(4).
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For those who advocate the strict separation of Church and
State, the intimate relationship between charter schools and state
government strongly suggests that such schools should not be
permitted to have a religious focus. Nonetheless, the criteria set
forth in Zelman are relatively easy to comply with, and many
alternative education programs could be manipulated to fund
religious education with state money without violating the
Establishment Clause. In light of Zelman's analysis, which makes
possible the funding religious education without violating the
Establishment Clause, opponents must focus on other issues. The
next section considers new battlegrounds.
V.

STRATEGIES FOR OPPONENTS OF PUBLICLY FUNDED RELIGIOUS
EDUCATION IN THE WAKE OF ZELMAN

Those wary of alternative education programs that provide
state money to religious schools have three hopes for keeping
Zelman's permissive stance from controlling. They can (1) argue
that their state constitution is stricter than the Establishment Clause
(or propose amendments to make it so), (2) distinguish programs in
their state from the voucher program upheld in Zelman, or (3) take
advantage of the questions left unanswered by Zelman.
A.

ConstitutionalAmendment

Because North Carolina's constitutional protection against
the Establishment Clause is demonstrably weaker than that found
in the federal Constitution, 122 a state constitutional solution would
need to rest in an amendment. However, such an approach may be
counter-productive.
Attempting to pass a constitutional
amendment that would take a stronger stance against the
establishment of religion, or specifically against funding religious
schools with public monies, might give rise to two significant
problems. First, it might bring to public attention the fact that
vouchers for parochial education would be constitutional in many
states. Second, it might engender a public backlash drawing on the
122. See discussion supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
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mounting criticism of Blaine Amendments.' 23 In view of these
concerns, a constitutional amendment would be undesirable in
most states.
B.

DistinguishingZelman

The possibilities for structuring alternative educational
programs are limited only by the bounds of human imagination.
Yet the criteria set forth in Zelman provide the boundaries for
constitutionally acceptable funding of religious education.
Therefore, it will be important for opponents of publicly funded
religious education to focus on distinctions between proposed local
alternative educational programs and the three criteria put forth in
Zelman and discussed above: neutrality toward religion, "true
private choice," and genuine secular options.
1. Neutrality
It is unlikely that a contested alternative education program
would be structured so as to explicitly favor religion, which would
clearly be unconstitutional.
However, the Zelman Court
emphasized the Cleveland program's absence of "financial
incentives" that "skew[ed]" the program in favor of religious
schools.' 24
A program's neutrality might, therefore, be
compromised by implicit financial incentives in favor of religious
schools. For example, a program might implicitly favor religious
schools by providing a funding level that consistently covers
tuition at religious schools but covers only a percentage of the
tuition at most non-religious private schools.125 Opponents of
school vouchers should be alert to this possible means of

123. See discussion supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
124. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2468 (2002) (quoting
Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487-88
(1986)).
125. But see Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2469 (referring to the availability of
free public education as evidence that the Cleveland voucher program did not

create financial incentives in favor of parochial schools).
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distinguishing voucher programs from the particular program
upheld in Zelman.
2. True Private Choice
As discussed above, aid provided directly to religious
schools by the state must be in the form of materials and
equipment restricted to secular use. 126 Financial aid not restricted
to secular use must arrive at religious schools only by way of the
individual decisions of non-governmental players such as parents,
and money cannot be allotted to religious schools on a per-pupil
basis. 127 A program's neutrality might, therefore, be compromised
by state choices to provide money to religious schools without
attaching appropriate restrictions on the use of those funds.
Otherwise, any program which funnels funds through parents will
be difficult to combat as being based on anything other than
individual decisions.
3. Genuine Secular Options
Arguing that genuine secular options are not sufficiently
available may be the best option for distinguishing a local
alternative education plan from the one upheld in Zelman. In
determining that genuine secular options existed in Zelman, the
Court relied on at least two factors which may be distinguishable
in other situations: (1) that the rate of participation of religious
private schools matched the ratio of religious private schools to
secular private schools across the state and (2) that Cleveland
public schools, magnet schools, and community schools were
sufficiently a part of the program to balance the participation of
128
religious schools.
Thus, it seems, under Zelman, the rate of participation of
religious schools in alternative educational programs should be
compared to the ratio between religious schools and private secular
schools across the state. If a fact-finder determines that religious
126. Mitchell v. Helms 530 U.S. 793, 809 (2000) (plurality opinion).
127. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
128. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2469-70.
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schools occupy a higher presence in a particular program than129they
do statewide, that program's neutrality may be compromised.
Another issue that must be examined is whether public
schools, including magnet schools and religious schools, are really
a part of the program. In Zelman, the Court said that in
considering whether the state is coercing children to attend
religious schools, the state must "evaluate ...all options Ohio
provides Cleveland schoolchildren."' 130 However, the Court also
emphasized the fact that students at public schools could receive
tutorial funds under the same legislation that provided other
students with vouchers.' 3' An educational aid program may be
found to be so outside the realm of regular public schools as to
prohibit consideration of public schools as available secular
choices.
A third option, addressed only briefly in Zelman, is the
possibility of arguing that the quality of the public schools is so
low as to leave no genuine secular option. 132 Justice O'Connor, in
her concurrence, wrote that she did "not agree that the nonreligious
schools have failed to provide Cleveland parents reasonable
alternatives to religious schools in the voucher program."' 33 This
leaves open the possibility that a school system could potentially
fail to provide "genuine" alternatives because of its inherent
weakness. Justice O'Connor also warned, however, that to qualify
as genuine options, nonreligious schools "need not be superior to
religious schools in every respect. They need only be adequate
' 34
substitutions for religious schools in the eyes of the parents."'
North Carolina is in a unique position to test this issue, having
129. Although Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion in Zelman specifically
stated that "[t]he constitutionality of a neutral educational aid program simply
does not turn on whether and why, in a particular area, at a particular time, most
private schools are run by religious organizations, or most recipients choose to
use the aid at religious schools," Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2470, Justice O'Connor's
crucial concurrence focused on the availability of genuine choice among
religious and non-religious schools, id. at 2476.
130. Id. at 2469.

131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 2470.
Id. at 2472; see also Pew Forum, supra note 8, at 5-6.
Zelman, 122 S. Ct.at 2477.
Id.
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actually litigated the state's requirement to provide a sound basic
education and judicially determined that, at least in Hoke County,
the required level of education is not being provided. 35 Thus,
North Carolina courts may be receptive to the argument that North
Carolina public schools cannot be considered a "genuine secular
option" under the Zelman rubric.
C.

UnansweredQuestions: What About Regulations that
Accompany Subsidies?

Zelman opened the door for the funneling of state aid to
religious schools through educational aid programs. However, it
also raised significant questions about the treatment of regulations
that usually accompany state money when such regulations come
into conflict with the religious beliefs of the receiving institutions.
These questions may be grouped into two set of concerns: that
government regulations attached to the receipt of state funding
may infringe on the religious liberty of religious institutions and
that such regulations may, in themselves, violate the Establishment
Clause.
1. Infringing on Religious Liberty?
Several Supreme Court decisions have empowered
government to impose restrictions on organizations as a condition
of receiving government subsidies.' 36 In Zelman, regulations of
this type prohibited participating schools from discriminating on
the basis of race, ethnicity, or religion, or from teaching unlawful
behavior or "hatred of any person or group" based on race,
ethnicity, or religion 1 37 Although Justice Souter argued that the
placing of such conditions on religious schools was in itself a
reason to find the Ohio voucher program unconstitutional, the
majority dismissed this concern, suggesting instead that taxpayers
135. See discussion supra Part II.
136. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977); Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998). See
generally Pew Forum, supra note 8, at 9-10.
137. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2463.
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would not have standing to assert an excessive entanglement
claim. 138 According to the Pew Forum on Religion and Public
Life, the pertinent question about religious liberty therefore
appears to be: "If the state imposes conditions on vouchers that
would affect the autonomy of a participating religious school, may
the school (or a parent wishing to use a voucher at the school)
challenge the condition as constitutionally forbidden?"' 39 Several
follow up questions come to mind. May a religious school
receiving funding through state vouchers hire teachers based on
their professed religious beliefs? Who decides whether a teaching
demonstrates hatred of another person or group? May a Christian
school teach that Islam is a violent religion, 40 or that Mohammad
was a terrorist?' 4 1 May a Christian or Muslim school teach that
homosexuality is a sin? These are not far-fetched questions, but
ones that religious
schools may face if they have to answer to state
4
regulations.'

2. Establishment of Religion
Concerned not to infringe on the religious liberty of
religious schools, states granting educational vouchers may exempt
religious schools from the anti-discrimination regulations that they
place on other organizations they subsidize. But if a state exempts
only religious schools, has not all neutrality been tossed to the
wind? In this event, according to the Pew Forum, the pertinent
question becomes: "If the state exempts only religious schools
from conditions on vouchers, is the exemption constitutionally
138. Id. at 2476; see also Pew Forum, supra note 8, at 9.
139. Pew Forum, supranote 8, at 9.
140. Pat Robertson, a religious broadcaster, asserted that Islam "is not a
peaceful religion that wants to coexist. They want to coexist until they can
control, dominate and then, if need be, destroy." A Nation Challenged: The
Religious Right; Islam is Violent in Nature, Pat Robertson Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 23, 2002, § A, pg. 17.
141. Jerry Falwell, a Baptist Minister, has stated publicly, "I think
Muhammad was a terrorist." Threats andResponses, Muhammad a Terroristto
Falwell,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2002, § A pg 17.
142. For a discussion of the constitutional claims and defenses that
parochial schools may assert in this regard, see Pew Forum, supra note 8, at 10.
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forbidden?"' 43 This question suggest a final strategy for opponents
of state funding for parochial schools to combat even those tuition
aid programs that comply with the strictures of Zelman. Arguably,
the inability to reconcile the state's need to guard against
discrimination and a religious institution's need to guard against
incursions on its religious liberty makes vouchers, or any other
educational aid program that funnels money to religious
institutions, an entirely unworkable solution.
VI. CONCLUSION

The roadmap set out in Zelman for addressing the
shortcomings of the public schools by paying private, often
religious schools, to educate children is clear. Unfortunately, from
the vantage of those opposed to programs which fund religious
education with public funds, the guiding criteria can be met rather
easily, such that states whose own constitutions do not provide a
stricter standard than that of the Establishment Clause must face
the possibility that educational aid programs can be manipulated so
as to allow state funding of religious education. North Carolina is
a prime example of a state that cannot turn to its own constitution
to provide an additional buffer between Church and State. Policy
makers and advocates opposed to using public money to fund
religious education must therefore be particularly alert both to the
characteristics that set charter schools (and any future educational
aid programs) apart from the voucher program upheld in Zelman,
and to arguments to be made in light of the new questions Zelman
has raised.

143. Pew Forum, supra note 8, at 9.
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